Bad start
Bad start
Updated 01:29am (Mla time) Nov 18, 2004
Inquirer News Service
Editor's Note: Published on page A12 of the November 18, 2004 issue of the Philippine Daily Inquirer
LAST Tuesday, a “rigodon” [rigadoon] of sorts took place between civilians and military men. Maj. Gen. Carlos F. Garcia was taken by the military to the Sandiganbayan anti-graft court, where he faces perjury charges before four of the court's divisions, three of which had issued warrants for his arrest. At the Sandiganbayan, Garcia posted P24,000 in bail. Court personnel fingerprinted him. Mug shots were taken. Then the court agreed to release him into the custody of Col. Henry Galarpe, the Armed Forces provost marshal. We call it a rigodon because the handing over to civilian hands, and handing back to military hands, of Garcia was not the result of all sides working together to get the wheel of justice turning but of presidential intervention.
Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) Chief of Staff Lt. Gen. Efren Abu did not want to hand over Garcia to the Sandiganbayan. His reason was, on the surface, admirable in its rigor: He didn't want Garcia allowed to post bail and possibly skip town. But as it turned out, after President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo ordered Garcia placed under the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, the court easily (and legally) gave the AFP custody over Garcia anyway.
So instead of the AFP acting true to Abu's declarations that he wanted to clean up the AFP, it now appears that the President had to practically strong-arm the military to place one of its own under civilian jurisdiction. Instead of appearing anxious to do everything to ensure Garcia's prosecution, the military has appeared more interested (yet again) in coddling one of its own.
As events proved, cooperation could easily have been achieved from the very start. Abu's fears of a public relations disaster if Garcia had used the civilian courts to post bail and flee justice were entirely unfounded. Incidentally, fears that civilian proceedings might derail the military court martial, and vice versa, are unfounded, too.
The Sandiganbayan will try Garcia on perjury charges arising from alleged misdeclarations in his Statement of Assets, Liabilities and Net Worth for the years 1997 up to 2000. The military, on the other hand, is trying him for violating the Articles of War: for conduct unbecoming of an officer and a gentleman (something only the military can determine and judge), and for allegedly failing to declare all his assets for the years 2002 and 2003 (the years not covered by the Sandiganbayan charges), and for acquiring and holding a US immigrant status. At the same time, the Ombudsman has gotten into the act, investigating Garcia on possible charges of plunder. By no stretch of the imagination can Garcia be considered to be facing double jeopardy, that is, being tried more than once for the same charge. Indeed, on the question of double jeopardy, Justice Secretary Raul Gonzalez says it can be easily avoided if the prosecutors make sure that Garcia's court martial is confined to violations of the Articles of War, leaving the plunder case to the Sandiganbayan.
In military terms, the prosecution of Garcia involves a pincer movement. He is being attacked from two sides, involving the military and civilian courts of justice. The military and the civilian courts are trying him for different things, though some of the charges may be similar (they involve prosecution involving similar documents, but not, for example, identical documents).
Regardless of what Garcia does in his own defense, it is important for the government to keep ensuring the smooth cooperation of the military and civilian prosecutors and courts. The country cannot afford a legal wrangle between military and civilian government lawyers over who gets to try Garcia for what. As it stands, the division of charges, so to speak, is sensible and clear. It affords the government every opportunity to successfully prosecute Garcia. It also allows Garcia to methodically dispute the charges.
The military, though, must remain conscious of the fact that even if does not intend to do so, its actions can easily be misconstrued as coddling an accused officer. The military could have been more proactive, for example, in actively working out an arrangement whereby it keeps physical custody of Garcia, while being seen to be eager to submit him to civilian jurisdiction as well. Either the President was too impatient, or the matter could only be resolved by her intervention. If it was the former, then the military needs to explain itself better to its commander in chief. If it was the latter, then the military was indeed coddling Garcia. Either way, things got off to a bad start.
Updated 01:29am (Mla time) Nov 18, 2004
Inquirer News Service
Editor's Note: Published on page A12 of the November 18, 2004 issue of the Philippine Daily Inquirer
LAST Tuesday, a “rigodon” [rigadoon] of sorts took place between civilians and military men. Maj. Gen. Carlos F. Garcia was taken by the military to the Sandiganbayan anti-graft court, where he faces perjury charges before four of the court's divisions, three of which had issued warrants for his arrest. At the Sandiganbayan, Garcia posted P24,000 in bail. Court personnel fingerprinted him. Mug shots were taken. Then the court agreed to release him into the custody of Col. Henry Galarpe, the Armed Forces provost marshal. We call it a rigodon because the handing over to civilian hands, and handing back to military hands, of Garcia was not the result of all sides working together to get the wheel of justice turning but of presidential intervention.
Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) Chief of Staff Lt. Gen. Efren Abu did not want to hand over Garcia to the Sandiganbayan. His reason was, on the surface, admirable in its rigor: He didn't want Garcia allowed to post bail and possibly skip town. But as it turned out, after President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo ordered Garcia placed under the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, the court easily (and legally) gave the AFP custody over Garcia anyway.
So instead of the AFP acting true to Abu's declarations that he wanted to clean up the AFP, it now appears that the President had to practically strong-arm the military to place one of its own under civilian jurisdiction. Instead of appearing anxious to do everything to ensure Garcia's prosecution, the military has appeared more interested (yet again) in coddling one of its own.
As events proved, cooperation could easily have been achieved from the very start. Abu's fears of a public relations disaster if Garcia had used the civilian courts to post bail and flee justice were entirely unfounded. Incidentally, fears that civilian proceedings might derail the military court martial, and vice versa, are unfounded, too.
The Sandiganbayan will try Garcia on perjury charges arising from alleged misdeclarations in his Statement of Assets, Liabilities and Net Worth for the years 1997 up to 2000. The military, on the other hand, is trying him for violating the Articles of War: for conduct unbecoming of an officer and a gentleman (something only the military can determine and judge), and for allegedly failing to declare all his assets for the years 2002 and 2003 (the years not covered by the Sandiganbayan charges), and for acquiring and holding a US immigrant status. At the same time, the Ombudsman has gotten into the act, investigating Garcia on possible charges of plunder. By no stretch of the imagination can Garcia be considered to be facing double jeopardy, that is, being tried more than once for the same charge. Indeed, on the question of double jeopardy, Justice Secretary Raul Gonzalez says it can be easily avoided if the prosecutors make sure that Garcia's court martial is confined to violations of the Articles of War, leaving the plunder case to the Sandiganbayan.
In military terms, the prosecution of Garcia involves a pincer movement. He is being attacked from two sides, involving the military and civilian courts of justice. The military and the civilian courts are trying him for different things, though some of the charges may be similar (they involve prosecution involving similar documents, but not, for example, identical documents).
Regardless of what Garcia does in his own defense, it is important for the government to keep ensuring the smooth cooperation of the military and civilian prosecutors and courts. The country cannot afford a legal wrangle between military and civilian government lawyers over who gets to try Garcia for what. As it stands, the division of charges, so to speak, is sensible and clear. It affords the government every opportunity to successfully prosecute Garcia. It also allows Garcia to methodically dispute the charges.
The military, though, must remain conscious of the fact that even if does not intend to do so, its actions can easily be misconstrued as coddling an accused officer. The military could have been more proactive, for example, in actively working out an arrangement whereby it keeps physical custody of Garcia, while being seen to be eager to submit him to civilian jurisdiction as well. Either the President was too impatient, or the matter could only be resolved by her intervention. If it was the former, then the military needs to explain itself better to its commander in chief. If it was the latter, then the military was indeed coddling Garcia. Either way, things got off to a bad start.
posted by Dante at 10:28 AM
0 Comments:
Post a Comment
<< Home